Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hacking. Show all posts

Saturday, April 02, 2022

bon voyage: Web3 Generation Security...

Software developers must have a few thoughts in 2022 and beyond, about the design of public web sites or internal corporate systems.

Many of them are taught these software architectures over the course of a long career in information technology. Or a few hours watching YouTube.

When you setup your particular login account with an online site for the first time, do you ever ask yourself how they decided on this particular process step-by-step for your login credentials?

For example, is the sign-in page to your account requesting an E-mail address for your user name? Or your phone number?

Why?

OR is the sign-in page to your account requesting that you create a unique User Name that is “NOT” your E-Mail address?

Why?

In either case, most login info is validated, before you get to see the box to type in your password. Or Maybe not.

So what about the login page that has your E-mail Address and your Password fields both on the same page? One underneath the other.

You see, software developers have designed their site a particular way for a reason. Is it standardized rules in the company, city, state, or GDPR country?

Or is it something else. :)

Now, we all should have something called Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled ON for your login as well. If your site does not have it or does not require it, you have to ask yourself.

Why?

Perhaps some of you carry around a little device on your key ring (or not allowed) that has a PIN number to open it, then a little LCD window that shows a 6 or 7 digit number that is constantly changing. You know who you are. “I am not using an Authenticator that is on my phone, designed by the same people who created the web site.”

"And then there is this: You'll receive only one verification code each time you request two-step identity verification by text. See Privacy Policy and Mobile Terms and Conditions for more information. Message and data rates may apply."

Some of you have given up. Enough is enough.

Why not just let the computer USE MY FACE as a way to open up the use of this device or this web site? After all, my ears sticking out, are actually very unique and the FACE ID software will not ever be confused.

Are you winning or losing in Web3?

Godspeed!

Saturday, January 09, 2021

Reengineering: Our Next American Decade Together…

 As you stand before the U.S. Capitol in Washington D.C. on this January 2021 evening, what are your thoughts?

When you walk down the sidewalk towards the AT&T building in downtown Nashville, what comes to your mind?

After you contemplate these two physical building locations, now think about the virtual scale of the digital SolarWinds software hack?

Our greatest adversary in a world full of Evil and continuous “Asymmetric Warfare,” is a Noun:

Definition of complacency - noun

1 : self-satisfaction especially when accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or deficiencies. When it comes to safety, complacency can be dangerous.

2 : an instance of usually unaware or uninformed self-satisfaction.

Operational Risk Management (ORM) has never been more vital, as our next decade opens before us in the United States.

People, Processes, Systems and External Events shall be our focus and our major problem-set in the U.S. Public and Private Sector.

Where does it begin? How will we as Americans unite to overcome complacency? When you wake up tomorrow, start with the thought of another word in the dictionary.

This time, we must counter our adversary “complacency” and be proactive to show a sign of action:

Definition of reengineer - verb

1 : to engineer again or anew : redesign

2 : to reorganize the operations of (an organization) so as to improve.

Our lost values and the speed of our digital world, has incrementally overtaken us. We must now realize, that we have a new opportunity before us.

First, we must Understand. Decide. Act. We must Reengineer. We must demonstrate Integrity.

Second, who do you know in your circle of human relationships that could use a hug or a “Thank You” today.

And how might you together, make your levels of “Trust” grow even greater?  How might you work side-by-side to eliminate any sign of complacency?  To improve the quality of _____?

You see, as Americans, we shall have continuous pride on what we have accomplished so far.

The rest of the globe is counting on our future.  Onward…

Sunday, November 22, 2020

CyberCom: Real-Time Situational Awareness...

The Operational Risks to your enterprise that are associated with your digital assets, networks and infrastructure are vast.

What is your organizations exposure today?

The amount of daily "Cyber Intelligence" flowing into the organization is growing exponentially and there are few hours in the day to analyze it. You have invested hundreds of thousands if not millions on cyber security to keep your corporate systems protected and ready for any significant business disruptions.

Electronic Stored Information (ESI) is continuously being discussed at the Board of Directors meetings. Data Breach Notification Laws are being amended and the congressional pipeline for privacy and cyber laws is in full swing in the United States.

The Fortune 500 is already paying for "White Hat" hackers to test their online and data security. The only way to continuously determine the effectiveness of risk management controls, is to continuously test them in a lab or scenario environment.

This "Red Cell" approach to attacking the corporate assets from the "inside out" or the "outside in" provides the intelligence necessary to close the gaps and vulnerabilities. These penetration or vulnerability tests are necessary and the ecosystem of companies of sources and methods is expansive.

A Fortune 500 organization may currently subscribe to annual services that provide the intelligence that gives them an alert of a "Red Flag" in their security landscape.

The company that provides the intelligence is paying a substantial fee to a network of sophisticated professionals to exploit the vulnerabilities in software coding. Namely, the design, configuration or implementation of a complex set of technologies to determine where and how these vulnerabilities may pose a threat to your assets.

The model for Enterprise OPS Risk Management in the most savvy and enlightened critical infrastructure dependent organizations realize that cyber security is not a department or a unit at the company.

It remains a horizontal platform on which all business units and the departments of the organization rest and it's pervasive mechanisms for the security and safety of people, processes, systems and external events must operate 24 X 7 X 365.

Our future is about "Defend Forward" or an "Real-Time Situational Awareness" strategy.

"The “defend forward” concept outlined in the DoD’s 2018 cyber strategy charges Cyber Command to get as close to adversaries in networks outside the United States before they reach the nation. The command uses its authorities to operate in networks abroad to discover malware and enemy tactics that could be used against the American people or election infrastructure.

The command can either share that with relevant partners — such as the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI or private companies — so they can take necessary measures, or the command can unilaterally take action thwart malicious activities before they impact American networks."

The public and the consumer are becoming used to the fact, that the challenge continues to be an iterative process and worthy of some levels of patience. 

"Operational Risk Management (ORM) is not about eliminating all threats to the enterprise. It is about the speed and accuracy of understanding the current levels and threat vectors so you can effectively deter, detect, defend and document."

This "4D" approach to risk management in the rapidly changing, digitally mobile organization of 2020 and beyond is a shift away from pure information security thinking that is housed within the Information Technology Department...

Sunday, May 24, 2020

Memorial Day 2020: Understand | Decide | Act...

Walking through Section 60 at Arlington National Cemetery on Memorial Day weekend is a stark reminder of the Operational Risk Management challenges we have faced these past 19+ years.  One example can be found in the budget at the Pentagon, on how to defeat the IED.

Billions of dollars are devoted to the strategies and tactics to keep U.S. "boots on the ground" on foreign lands from becoming KIA, an amputee or another invisible wound such as Traumatic Brain Injury or Post Traumatic Stress.

Regardless of the dollars devoted, many grave markers in Section 60 have birth dates in the 1980's and 1990's.  Standing there remembering Neil, a tear rolled down a cheek and the wind quickly blew it away...

"Memorial Day is a United States federal holiday which occurs every year on the final Monday of May.[1] Memorial Day is a day of remembering the men and women who died while serving in the United States Armed Forces.[2] Formerly known as Decoration Day, it originated after the American Civil War to commemorate the Union and Confederate soldiers who died in the Civil War. By the 20th century, Memorial Day had been extended to honor all Americans who have died while in the military service[3]."
If you are currently in the military we will thank you for your courage of service on Veterans Day, as we have before.  This day however, is for those in the U.S. forces who have died while serving.

Simultaneously, we must thank all of the other "Operational Risk Management" subject matter experts.  The "Quiet Professionals" who operate everyday in the shadows.  We hope that their decisions will continue to be the right ones.  They live each day with the burden of managing risk decisions, that could send another U.S. patriot on their way to Section 60 or a remembrance "Star" on the wall at Langley.

Whether you are a Mother, Father, Brother, Sister, Family or Friend, this Federal Holiday is your day of memorial to your loved one(s).

Some would say that our country is currently at a degree of War.  Even though there is no official written declaration, that has been written and published to the world.

Yet, these three words, in this order, and in that continuous "Chain," means everything to those who have served and will serve our United States. 

    > Understand.

    > Decide.

    > Act.

Until the day, that all our military and all of our true "First Responders" decide, that America is no longer worth fighting for, these three words will consume them.

Thank you for being there...

Saturday, July 13, 2019

Red Zone: Behavioral Analysis Interviews...

Industrial Espionage and the theft of trade secrets is continuously on every Operational Risk Management (ORM) executives mind these days.  The names Chelsea Manning and Julian Assange have been headline news for years.

In addition, the 2009 conviction under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 in the United States, is a stark reminder of the accelerated requirements for an "Insider Threat Program" (InTP), by the counter intelligence and OPSEC units of major public and private organizations.  Flashback to a decade ago:

"A former Rockwell and Boeing engineer from Orange County, CA was remanded into custody this morning after a federal judge convicted him of charges of economic espionage and acting as an agent of the People’s Republic of China, for whom he stole restricted technology and Boeing trade secrets, including information related to the Space Shuttle program and Delta IV rocket."

How 250,000 pages of classified, proprietary and otherwise sensitive information was found under this employees house is a good question? What might be an even more interesting question is pertaining to the controls for OPSEC and INFOSEC at Boeing in Orange County, CA a decade ago.

Information Operations (IO) or Information Security controls are only as good as the creativity and the will of the individual human being, that exploits the vulnerabilities in the design, configuration or implementation of your layers of defense.

This is why the counter intelligence and OPSEC capabilities within the enterprise must be ever vigilant and continuously adapting to the changing personnel within the organization.

In collaboratin with the Information Technology organization, the Digital Operational Risks that the OPSEC team is focused on these days, has to do with Data Loss Prevention (DLP)  software platforms and proactive data exfiltration detection capabilities.

As companies such as Boeing and other Defense Industrial Base (DIB) institutions utilize the latest software, hardware and other technology to assist in the "insider" detection and prevention of stealing, changing or deleting sensitive information, there still remains the risk of human factors and social engineering.

Sometimes the low tech or human designed detection systems that work on behavioral sciences, can be just as effective as the newest software running on the fastest computer box.

One example is "The Reid Technique" in the context of doing routine interviews and investigations with a set of "Red Zone" employees. Who are the red zone employees?

Those individuals who have certain access to systems or information, leave the organization for involuntary reasons or people that may be 3rd party suppliers to the key people in the red zone. So how does the Reid Technique help?

"The Reid Technique is a method of meeting, conferring with, and evaluating, the subjects of an investigation. It involves three different components — factual analysis, interviewing, and interrogation. While each of these are separate and distinct procedures, they are interrelated in the sense that each serves to help eliminate innocent suspects during an investigation."

The "Integrity Interview" is a highly structured interview with a job applicant. The purpose for the interview is to develop factual information about the applicant's past behavioral patterns.

The philosophy behind the interview is very straightforward. The most accurate indicator of an individual's future behavior, is their recent past behavior.

The same technique can be used on a departing employee with the emphasis on adherence to all "Acceptable Use" policies, regarding digital assets and cyberspace access to organizational data repositories.

Individuals who have the characteristics associated with deception, could be the target of a further investigation to determine whether any unauthorized information has been sent to an encrypted webmail account or if a 2 TB Thumb Drive happened to be plugged into a corporate laptop, the night before the last day on the job.

This low tech method may still be one of the most effective means for industrial espionage. Old school methods with 21st century technologies. All of the detection hardware and software, CCTV cameras, tagged files or RFID countermeasure, will not be able to thwart a diligent, patient and trusted insider.

Utilizing "Behavioral Interview Analysis" can make the difference between early detection or late reaction.

And while the OPSEC group is working on the "Lone Wolf" insider, there are swarms of non-state attackers initiating their asymmetric information operations strategy on the corporations and governments worldwide.

Economic espionage and attacks on nations states critical infrastructures, requires a substantial shift in policy and taxonomy, if we are ever going to be effective in protecting our IP and trade secrets.

While the CEO's and the General's are being briefed on the latest facets of "Weaponizing Malware," we can only hope that OPSEC is still conducting the behavioral analysis exit interview.

A face to face encounter, with someone who may just be that one person, who has your most valuable intellectual property or trade secrets in the purse or backpack at their feet...

Saturday, January 19, 2019

International Risk: Cyberwarfare Rules of Engagement...

When the financial private sector views the actions of government, in terms of regulation and compliance, it is often considered another risk to its operations. Why? More rules and the need to report on oversight, creates new obstacles to other more valuable revenue producing activities.

CDOs were a focus in the movie "The Big Short" and is an example of a financial product that explains why the government regulation mechanisms continue to exist. Yet the implementation of internal controls, to thwart the embezzlement of funds or the theft of proprietary intellectual secrets, is something that is encouraged and welcomed in the banking community. This paradox is something that continues to occur in the cyber risk management domain.

The dawn of Internet banking, spawned many of the Operational Risks associated with using public networks for our various banking transactions. The oversight of cyber risk management in the financial institution, is still a major challenge yet becoming more mature by the day.

Government is more effectively learning how to apply the right oversight with private sector institutions, through the use of International Standards such as ISO 27001 and NIST best practices to protect Critical Infrastructure.

The newest strategies for cyber risk management have been a robust topic of global conversation. New reports on the origin of state sponsored hacking and cyber crime data breach incidents, has produced some new theories on how to address these international Operational Risks:

"Deadly force against organized hackers could be justified under international law, according to a document created by a panel of legal and cyber warfare experts. Use of lethal force on those behind a cyberattack on a nation would be legal if the virtual attack meets criteria similar to those currently accepted for real-world warfare, said Michael N. Schmitt, chairman of the International Law Department at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. Schmitt is the editor of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, a 300-page book put together by a score of experts at the request of NATO and published by Cambridge University Press."

Even the most knowledgeable cyber experts, are at odds over the topic of "Active Defense" and the use of asymmetric cyber force, to retaliate against a so called attack or denial of service. A kinetic response is much more clear, based upon the source or attribution evidence of the attack. In the cyber domain, the word "Attribute" has some very interesting ramifications.

The State-of-Play will remain the same and for good reason. The governments of the world do not have issue with each other performing reciprocal cyber espionage. This practice is just a new version of intelligence collection and the next manifestation of Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy. However, if there should be any visible or kinetic damage to infrastructure, then the Tallinn Manual will be a vital resource for all. The question remains, what is a cyberattack? Jim Lewis said over five years ago:
“Cyberattack” is one of the most misused terms in the discussion of Chinese hackers. With very few exceptions, China has not used force against the United States in cyberspace. What it has been doing is spying. And spying, cyber or otherwise, is not an attack or grounds for war, even if military units are the spies. Spying isn’t even a crime under international law, and it wouldn’t be in Washington’s interest to make it so."
  Cyberwarfare Rules of Engagement remains a significant international Operational Risk...

Saturday, January 05, 2019

Quantum Governance: The Rules of Trust...

People are learning to trust an AI, to make decisions on their behalf.  This will change our world exponentially in the next 10 years.

Now that we have reached connectivity to the Net with 50% of the human connected population, the AI of the IoT will be a growing trust factor in our daily lives.

We are accelerating beyond the simple tools of trusting that the answers to our questions are correct from "Siri" or "Alexa."  Accepting the trusted route from Google Maps on the most ideal navigation to our destination is already a given.

Beyond the consumer, the "Algo Bots" and Algorithmic Trading have already replaced the previous years of approximately 600 Goldman Sachs traders with 2 people, to oversee daily operations on the floor.  There are others who have already predicted the replacement of other human operators in various public and private decision-making bodies.

So what?

Trust Decisions in the next decade will be augmented by "Artificial Intelligence" on a more frequent basis.  That is already a given for many groups of decision makers across the globe.  The question is, how will governments begin to regulate AI?

Who will be in charge of making sure that the code and the algorithmic activity is correct?  That the rules behind the Trust Decisions are correct?

You see, as the software becomes more invasive in an individuals daily life and we rely on it for the truth, governments will be involved.  They already are.

The "rules for composing the rules, that lead to millions of peoples trusted decisions is at stake.  Maybe even more so, the evolution of "Quantum Law."  For those thought leaders such as Jeffrey Ritter who have for years been so keen to articulate the emergence of the thought of governance of unstructured data, there is this:
"We are moving from a time in which we presume that all electronic information is true to a time in which we can affirmatively calculate what it is and know the rules by which it is governed on the fly," Ritter said. "That's quantum governance."
You realize that the words will live on for eternity and for others to always contemplate.  That is a given, that all of us shall be considering for our future, sooner than later.

So how might decision making bodies such as the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) utilize AI?  Greg Lindsay and August Cole have already addressed this years ago with METIS:

"The result is a national security apparatus capable of operating at, as you like to say, “at the speed of thought”—which is still barely fast enough to keep up with today’s AI-enhanced threats. It required a wrenching shift from deliberative policymaking to massively predictive analysis by machines, with ultimate responsibility concentrated in your hands at the very top."

In 2019, begin thinking deeper and longer about your TrustDecisions...

Saturday, October 06, 2018

National Security: Cyber Infrastructure Risk...

Is your organization a threat to National Security? That depends on whether you own, install, and maintain Critical Infrastructure. When you hear that term, "Critical Infrastructure" what comes instantly to mind? A bridge, a road or some other shovel ready project?

Yes, the hard leap for many to get their head around is that your cell phone, TV and Internet connection are vital "Critical Infrastructure" and if you are a Verizon, AT&T, Sprint or large cable company in the United States; National Security is a top of mind issue.

Is it possible that our country is at risk because of the same "Risk Management" paradigm that has plagued the Financial Services industry? A lack of resources and focus to deter, detect, defend and document risks to our critical infrastructure, could turn into a systemic and interdependent threat to our national security.

How can you make the case for a 2008 era economic meltdown in the financial services sector, to be similar to the potential failure of the Communications, Information Technology, Water or Energy sector?

It's easy. Look at human behavior and to the motivators of greed, selfishness and just plain blindness to a "risk bubble" just waiting to burst. Who will be the next Bear Stearns, in the Communications Sector?

The truth is, that some Fortune 500 companies marketing departments, may have a larger budget than the information systems, internal audit department and the security department combined. When the nuts and bolts, concrete and plumbing associated with electronic commerce, banking, and just plain mobile communications come to a slow crawl or halt in it's tracks, the government will have to do the same thing all over again.

Bail out or restore the industry and the companies, who are the lifeblood of our Critical Infrastructure.

Our National Security is at stake and the owners and operators are still waiting for the right incentives to invest in robust maintenance and security programs, instead of just more marketing. After all, market share is what shareholders ask about, along with how many new subscribers you won or lost last quarter.

How often do we hear the question at the shareholders meeting, that asks about the amount of downtime, failed systems or customers without service, as a result of a "Glitch" or fried circuit board?

So how does the electronic critical infrastructure really impact National Security?  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the lead.  The mission is to lead the national effort to secure Critical Infrastructure from all hazards by managing risk and enhancing resilience through collaboration with the critical infrastructure community.

"The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads and coordinates national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience and has established strong partnerships across government and the private sector. The office conducts and facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators and State, local, tribal, and territorial partners understand and address risks to critical infrastructure. IP provides information on emerging threats and hazards so that appropriate actions can be taken. The office also offers tools and training to partners to help them manage the risks to their assets, systems, and networks."

A culture of risk management is slowly moving it's way into the Board Room conversations and the CEO may be on notice, if the "Tone at the Top" is not focused on Enterprise Business Resilience. However, that "Tone at the Top" needs to go beyond the shareholder value conversation, to the National Security topic.

One only has to look further in a few places on the "Net," to better understand what the offensive cyberwarfare conversation is all about, as the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) has evolved in the past few years.

Once you understand that many cyber incidents with our U.S. Critical Infrastructure are just a test, then you will realize that U.S. shovel ready projects need a new public service announcement (PSA), with a shock value of texting while driving.

The risk of a specific kind of behavior on the road or the critical infrastructure complacency within the corporate enterprise, can have the same results. We have already nationalized the likes of AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae after the last financial crisis.

Perhaps it time to do the same for Amazon, Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and others, who are vital assets in our National Security and have them report directly to the Pentagon...think about it.

Sunday, May 06, 2018

IO Convergence: Cyber Warfare Unified Taxonomy...

Information Operations (IO) is an Operational Risk Management priority in both the public and private sector these days. Is it lawful for a U.S. company and U.S. citizens to train and perform cyber warfare activities on behalf of a foreign country?

Flashback to 2012, The Washington Post reports:

By Ellen Nakashima, Published: November 22
"In the spring of 2010, a sheik in the government of Qatar began talks with the U.S. consulting company Booz Allen Hamilton about developing a plan to build a cyber-operations center. He feared Iran’s growing ability to attack its regional foes in cyberspace and wanted Qatar to have the means to respond.

Several months later, officials from Booz Allen and partner firms met at the company’s sprawling Tysons Corner campus to review the proposed plan. They were scheduled to take it to Doha, the capital of the wealthy Persian Gulf state.

That was when J. Michael McConnell, then a Senior Vice-President at Booz Allen and former Director of National Intelligence in the George W. Bush administration, learned that Qatar wanted U.S. personnel at the keyboards of its proposed cyber-center, potentially to carry out attacks on regional adversaries.

“Are we talking about actually conducting these operations?” McConnell asked, according to several people at the meeting. When someone said that was the idea, McConnell uttered two words: “Hold it.”
A common taxonomy was developed years ago for the cyber terms of the computer and network incident domain. Now we need to make sure we all understand what we mean when we say Information Operations policy as it pertains to the digital world.

As an example, in the context of the digital attacker we have Sandia Labs Taxonomy:
  • Hacker
  • Spies
  • Terrorists
  • Corporate Raiders
  • Professional Criminals
  • Vandals
  • Voyeurs
Each is unique and has its own domain or category. We are sure that the same could be used for the context of attackers in the non-digital world, possibly with the exception of Hacker. However, the definition of corporate raider in the off line domains may not be synonymous with the on line domain of cyber incidents.

If we look at the categories that make up the entire "Incident" that Sandia Labs has utilized, we see the following:
  • Attackers
  • Tool
  • Vulnerability
  • Action
  • Target
  • Unauthorized Results
  • Objectives
Without combining the context under each category, we lose the impact of what we are trying to make contextual with regard to an "Incident". We need to make sure that the anti-terrorism taxonomies of the off line and on line domains can be utilized together to describe the attributes of an "Incident". We need to break down the sub-categories as well. For instance, in the Sandia Labs Taxonomy for the Objectives category we have:
  • Challenge, Status, Thrill
  • Political Gain
  • Financial Gain
  • Damage
When we move to the off line domain and are doing risk mitigation and preparedness exercises for anti-terrorism we utilize another set of words to describe and evaluate infrastructure threats and hazards.  Here are Five factors:
  • Existence addresses the question of who is hostile to the assets of concern?
  • Capability addresses the question of what weapons have been used in carrying out past attacks?
  • History addresses the question of what has the potential threat element (aggressor) done in the past and how many times?
  • Intention addresses the question of what does the potential threat element hope to achieve?
  • Targeting addresses the question of do we know if an aggressor is performing surveillance on our assets?
Two years later, the Washington Post reports:

By Ellen Nakashima, Published: November 14
President Obama has signed a secret directive that effectively enables the military to act more aggressively to thwart cyber­attacks on the nation’s web of government and private computer networks.
Presidential Policy Directive 20 establishes a broad and strict set of standards to guide the operations of federal agencies in confronting threats in cyberspace, according to several U.S. officials who have seen the classified document and are not authorized to speak on the record. The president signed it in mid-October. The new directive is the most extensive White House effort to date to wrestle with what constitutes an “offensive” and a “defensive” action in the rapidly evolving world of cyberwar and cyberterrorism, where an attack can be launched in milliseconds by unknown assailants utilizing a circuitous route. For the first time, the directive explicitly makes a distinction between network defense and cyber-operations to guide officials charged with making often-rapid decisions when confronted with threats.
The policy also lays out a process to vet any operations outside government and defense networks and ensure that U.S. citizens’ and foreign allies’ data and privacy are protected and international laws of war are followed.

“What it does, really for the first time, is it explicitly talks about how we will use cyber-operations,” a senior administration official said. “Network defense is what you’re doing inside your own networks. . . . Cyber-operations is stuff outside that space, and recognizing that you could be doing that for what might be called defensive purposes.”
We believe that as our cultures, countries, agencies and professionals work together on Information Operations (IO) and online counter-terrorism initiatives, we are going to have to develop a solid taxonomy. It will provide the foundation for our clear and accurate risk management methodologies and incident management systems, being developed by relevant organizations in mutual collaboration.

Once we have accomplished this fundamental understanding, then true Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) cooperation and coordination will occur.

Sunday, April 22, 2018

Unthinkable: Adapting in New World Disorder...

Will 2018 bring more data breaches, lost laptops and insider threats than 2017?  This is why CSO's, CPO's and corporate General Counsels have their teams working overtime.

When the enemy is increasing their attacks, utilizing new strategies and leveraging the existing base of compromised organizational intellectual and data assets, the future horizon becomes ever more clear. 

The statistics don't lie.  1579 documented Data Breaches occurred in 2017. Up 44.7% according to reports by the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) compared to the previous year.  It is the new normal.

The Insider Threat Program (InTP) however, remains a key focus for Operational Risk Management (ORM) professionals because human behaviors are exaggerated during periods of stress, fear and uncertainty. This means that people who may have never considered doing something to jeopardize their reputations, may now be up against a wall.

When there is no obvious exit and no way out, people will do extraordinary things to get ahead, beat the odds and hedge their own risk portfolio of life.

In Joshua Cooper Ramo's book "The Age of the Unthinkable", "Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It" the author discusses the concept of Deep Security. His analogy of how to think about "Deep Security" is the biological immune system:
"A reactive instinct for identifying dangers, adapting to deal with them, and then moving to control and contain the risk they present."
The key word in Ramo's writing is "Adapt".  Being Adaptive.  However, prior to this there are two other very vital words that we feel are even more imperative. Instinct. Identifying. In other words, Proactive Intuition.

Ask any savvy investigator on how she solved the case and you may hear just that, "I had a hunch."

Talk with a Chief Privacy Officer in any Global 500 company.  You might get them to admit they have a sense that their organization will be the target of an "Insider data breach" incident in the coming year or two.

Do you remember signing off on reading and your acceptance of the employee handbook?  When did your organization last make changes to the Corporate Employee policies?  We would start with the updates to the following sections:
  • MEDIA CONTACT
  • SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY
  • REMOTE ACCESS POLICY
  • E-MAIL, VOICE MAIL AND COMPUTER NETWORK SYSTEM PRIVACY
  • (YOUR ORGANIZATION) RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION
  • SYSTEMS USE RESTRICTED TO COMPANY BUSINESS
  • FORBIDDEN CONTENT
  • PASSWORD SECURITY AND INTEGRITY
  • INTERNET ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY
  • POLICY ON USE OF SOFTWARE
  • COMPANY PROPERTY
  • PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS/NON-DISCLOSURE OF COMPANY INFORMATION 
Due to the increasing complexity of IT systems, cloud computing, data networks and the hundreds or thousands of laptops and mobile devices circling the globe with company executives and employees is enough to predict that a major breach will occur.

Being adaptive and having proactive intuition in the modern enterprise does not come natural. You have to work at it and it requires a substantial investment in time and resources to make it work effectively.  Proactive Intuition.

Once you realize that all of the controls, technology and physical security are not going to keep you out of harms way, you are well on your way to reaching the clairvoyance of "The Age of the Unthinkable."

Saturday, July 16, 2016

Utility of Attack: Target Selection and Execution...

The threat spectrum for Operational Risk Management (ORM) professionals is wide and they are constantly evaluating opportunities to learn.  Recent data breaches, terrorist attacks and the strategies utilized by adversaries online and on the ground, has surfaced another key lesson learned:
u·til·i·ty n. (pl. -ties) 1 the state of being useful, profitable, or beneficial (in game theory or economics) a measure of that which is sought to be maximized in any situation involving a choice.  The New Oxford American Dictionary
Here are two data breach examples:
  1. On May 30, 2016, Omni Hotels discovered they were the victim of malware attacks on their network affecting specific point of sale systems on-site at some Omni properties. The malware was designed to collect certain payment card information, including cardholder name, credit/debit card number, security code and expiration date. They have no indication that reservation or Select Guest membership systems were affected.  50,000 records are impacted.
     
  2. Prior to May 2016, identity thieves stole tax and salary data from big-three credit bureau Equifax Inc., according to a letter that grocery giant Kroger sent to all current and some former employees. The nation’s largest grocery chain by revenue appears to be one of several Equifax customers that were similarly victimized this year. Atlanta-based Equifax’s W-2 Express site makes electronic W-2 forms accessible for download for many companies, including Kroger — which employs more than 431,000 people.  According to a letter Kroger sent to employees dated May 5 2016, thieves were able to access W-2 data merely by entering at Equifax’s portal the employee’s default PIN code, which was nothing more than the last four digits of the employee’s Social Security number and their four-digit birth year.
Here are two terrorist attack examples:

In two major domestic terrorism events in the United States this past year, "Utility" was a major factor and should not be discounted, in analyzing motivations and "modus operandi" of homegrown violent extremists.  In San Bernardino, CA the adversaries were planning a major attack and had already stockpiled explosives and ammunition.  In Dallas (Mesquite), TX the adversary was planning a major attack and had already stockpiled a cache of explosives as well.

In both of these cases, the adversaries had accumulated and trained to use explosives in an attack.  Then they came upon a choice.  A utility.
  1. In San Bernardino, an incident with government co-workers motivated the employee attacker to deviate from the intended plans and to capitalize on the "Utility" of a workplace holiday gathering at the county facilities.
  2. In Dallas, a peaceful protest march that would attract a significant government presence of police officers, motivated the attacker to deviate from future plans and to capitalize on the "Utility" of a public gathering.
Dr. Erroll Southers is correct:
While the impetus for attack is rooted in beliefs, a terrorist’s selection of how and where to attack is based on a consideration of utility. This is the estimate of an attack’s consequences with respect to the intended target’s value as a domestic or international interest and the political impact the attack will have on the intended audience. Utility is a primary consideration for extremists during preparation for an attack, weighing desired results against the investment in activities to plan, rehearse and execute an operation. Always mindful of the aftermath, utility weighs heavily in the decision-making process of target selection, possible attack paths, methodologies and execution.  Southers, Erroll (2014-09-25). Homegrown Violent Extremism (pp. 9-10).
In both cases, the adversaries accelerated their plans.  They abandoned their use of explosives and a future planned event, to act on their emotions and motivations of the moment.  Domestic Terrorism in the United States will continue at a rapid pace without a more serious focus, on Homegrown Violent Extremism.

Whether it be online with the trust of your data systems or offline with the safety and security of your citizens, employees and facilities, beware of the changing opportunities for your adversaries, to launch their attack...
Utility, leveraged by your adversaries, is a consideration that must be continuously evaluated and analyzed in your particular threat environment.

Sunday, August 30, 2015

CAG 20: Red Team Exercises...

The Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG) have been public for years and the 20 controls are vital to our enterprise business resilience. One stands out however that is not automated and requires a specific advance Operational Risk Management (ORM) strategy. CAG: Critical Control 20: Red Team Exercises:
Attackers penetrate networks and systems through social engineering and by exploiting vulnerable software and hardware. Once they get access, they burrow deep and expand the number of systems over which they have control. Most organizations do not exercise their defenses so they are uncertain about its capabilities and unprepared for identifying and responding to attack. 
This control goes beyond traditional penetration testing, which typically has the goal of identifying vulnerabilities and showing their business risks. Red Team Exercises are exercise in the traditional sense of military exercises where the three goals are improved readiness of the organization, better training for defensive practitioners, as well as inspection of current performance levels. Independent red teams can provide valuable objectivity regarding both the existence of vulnerabilities and the efficacy of defenses and mitigating controls already in place and even those planned for future implementation.
We would like to emphasize the importance of this strategy execution beyond the IT and Information Systems within the organization. In any significant business disruption or "incident", whether it be the breach and theft of a database full of "Personal Identity Information" (PII) or the breach of a rear window of a corporate executives residence to initiate a kidnapping plot; the goal remains the same:
"Attackers use tools to exploit a vulnerability; to create an action on a target, that produces an unauthorized result to obtain their objective."
Think about it for a minute. Whether it be the online digital world or the offline physical environment your organization is operating in today; someone is probing and testing your vulnerabilities. The only possible way for you to discover them before your adversary is to continuously attack your own business and it's assets. And possibly most importantly, it must be done on a clandestine basis:
clandestine from L. clandestinus "secret, hidden," from clam "secretly," from base of celare "to hide"
What value can be gained from exercises or testing that is conducted with advance warning to your staff or team? Very little. To execute the "Red Cell" approach to effectively improve and to increase the resilience of your organization, the strategy execution must remain secret. Yes of course there will be people placed throughout the organization, in key areas that know that the exercise or attack on the organization is a planned exercise. However, it is only for the safety and liability purposes, along with the potential injection of simulations that increase the effectiveness of the vulnerability testing.

The CAG has 20 controls that are focused on Cyber Defense and many of these will require manual intervention, planning and effective oversight. Automated tools can only go so far, to address the real goal of understanding human behavior during and after a "Real Incident" actually unfolds. In the context of using a Red Team exercise, you must include the use of Gavin De Becker's "Elements of Prediction" with your employees and stakeholders:
1. Measurability - How measurable is the outcome you seek to predict?
2. Vantage - Is the person making the prediction in a position to observe the pre-incident indicators and context?
3. Imminence - Are you predicting an outcome that might occur soon, as opposed to some remote time in the future?
4. Context - Is the context of the situation clear to the person making the prediction?
5. Pre-Incident Indicators - Are there detectable pre-incident indicators that will reliably occur before the outcome being predicted?
6. Experience - Does the person making the prediction have experience with the specific topic involved?
7. Comparable Events - Can you study or consider outcomes that are comparable- though not necessarily identical- to the one being predicted?
8. Objectivity - Is the person making the prediction objective enough to believe that either outcome is possible?
9. Investment - To what degree is the person making the prediction invested in the outcome?
10. Replicability - Is it practical to test the exact issue being predicted by trying it first elsewhere?
11. Knowledge - Does the person making the prediction have accurate knowledge about the topic?
This is how and where you extend your physical controls to the actual people, who will make the difference before and during a critical incident in your enterprise.  Revisit the Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG) for your enterprise.  It just might help you find that one place where the continuity of the business is at risk after a significant disruption or the one threat that still is hiding in the shadows.

Sunday, August 09, 2015

Leadership: Adaptive Risk for an Uncertain Future...

As the political season in the U.S. starts earlier and earlier each four year cycle, the question remains consistent from the rest of the world.  Will America lead the Cyber cold war in the next four years?  Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a necessary and vital component of any mission or project, from the Situation Room, inside your company, on the flight deck or on the front lines of conflict torn regions of the Sahel.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and their proxies are constantly waging new malware campaigns on our global economic and intellectual property ecosystems, utilizing sophisticated new toolkits.  There are three key attributes to modern day "Threat Intelligence" and Eric Olson from Cyveillance explains:

1. Relevance – The information must relate to, or at least potentially relate to, your enterprise, industry, networks, and/or objectives

2. Actionable – It must be specific enough to prompt some response, change, action or decision, or to dictate an explicit and informed decision not to act

3. Value – Even if relevant and actionable, if the data (and the action) does not contribute to any useful business outcome, there is no value

When threat activity, known actors, historical tactics, or attack information can be combined with vulnerabilities, activity data, or other particulars present in your network and environment, then the information becomes relevant, actionable intelligence.

As a leader in the private sector the waves of globalization and regulatory mandates keep you striving for the entrepreneurial spirit, yet constantly constrained by new rule-sets and compliance initiatives.  Mitigating risks to the enterprise requires leadership that can span the visions of an environment with creativity and simultaneously the spirit of autonomy.  Modern day risk management is not only a leadership challenge, it is also a cultural challenge.  How do I get my people to think like a true entrepreneur and simultaneously provide them with the skills and knowledge they will need to survive in a hostile environment?
  • First off, you have no doubt heard somewhere along the way that High Performing Teams are the way to accomplish new fixes to software code or even to ensure the last mile of due diligence to get the leveraged buy-out to become a reality.  These High Performing Teams must be diverse and they need to have the time to cross-train each other in the specific skill sets necessary, to fullfill the desired outcomes.  If one person comes down with the flu or worse; you may be the one who has to fill in and pick up the slack.
  • Second, the cultural mind set shift must take place to becoming continuously adaptive.  Being adaptive means that you have to be able to incorporate both readiness and resilience in the same effort.  Making decisions that are rapid without time for formal planning, is foreign to some on the team.  You have got to get everyone to be as adaptive as the designated leader, because they will not always be there, to tell you or show you what to do next.
  • Finally, leadership decisions on the floor of the exchange, in the EOC or sitting across the table from your newest prospective client means that you have got to practice.  This capability of assets calls for you to continuously train and experience the emotions and see the results of your actions.  Good and bad.  These skills are perishable and require a tremendous investment in time and resources to make sure that the risks of failure are mitigated almost to zero.
What are you willing and able to do, to lead America in 2015 and beyond?  Think service before self-interest and you will be leading beyond the risks of an uncertain future for yourself and our country.

Sunday, May 10, 2015

Metadata: Evidence of Terrorism vs. Crime...

What are the enterprise risks when metadata is legally defined as property?  Operational Risk Management (ORM) professionals are on high alert these days.  The court systems within the EU and now the United States, are building new cases and establishing new arguments.

As a steward of data and providing oversight on the transparency of how information is tagged, sorted, stored and archived, the ORM professional is right in the middle of the debate.  Metadata relevance is known to those who have been practicing the science and art of digital forensics for years.

Does your organization issue corporate devices for use in the workplace or on the job?  What transparency was provided when the digital device was issued on the use and ownership of the data associated with the device?  How many pages is the "Acceptable Use Policy" at your organization?

These policies on Mobile Device Management (MDM) or Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) are not new, yet they are still evolving.  This is because the technology innovation is so far advanced than the current legal precedence or court rulings.  The law will always catch up to technology and now the law is getting to an important milestone.

This however does not change how our adversaries are operating.  The current environment over the relevance of data, or who owns the metadata on our mobile devices, will not change the appetite for those who seek the data or exploit systems to cause failure or destruction.  If all of the laws in our land would stop crime or malicious intent in its tracks, then we could eliminate the entire legal enforcement structure.

The General Counsel and the outside legal teams at your organization are already working to reduce the risk of adverse litigation by employees, partners and customers.  The Chief Privacy Officers (CPO) and Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) are working 24/7 in tandem to operate legally and to insure the confidentiality, integrity and assurance of metadata across the globe.  Unfortunately they operate in an environment that involves humans, using digital devices.

The legal frameworks are quickly responding to the rising digital crime rate across the globe.  They are weary of the "Asymmetric Warfare" being waged by nation states.  Plaintiff lawyers are now preparing their new privacy and data breach cases on a weekly basis.  Organizations are seeking avenues of "Safe Harbor" by using certain products inside their infrastructure.  Yet will this all stem the tide of what weapons the adversaries are deploying, to perpetuate their business or espionage models?

This brings us to a prediction.  We predict the rise of metadata evidence that proves that organizations are the victims of cyber-terrorism, not cyber-crime.  Terrorism not fraud.  And now the courts and the jury pools will now decide what metadata is evidence and what the definition is of "Terrorism" in the cyber realm.  Marketing is a powerful engine to influence buyers.  Buyer beware:
"Last week, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) certified FireEye under the SAFETY Act, providing their customers protection from lawsuits or claims alleging that the products failed to prevent an act of cyber-terrorism.
The news of the certification was reported by FireEye in a press release, and stipulates that FireEye’s Multi-Vector Virtual Execution engine and Dynamic Threat Intelligence platform are the two products now on the SAFETY Act approved technologies list."
"The core of this is something we’ve been debating for a while: the definition of terrorism, and whether or not it can apply to cyber-stuffs. The end result looks like a legal get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that use FireEye, but for that to actually happen, it seems like we’d need a computer-related incident or breach to actually be declared an official 'Act of Terrorism' by the US government."

Sunday, March 15, 2015

Digital RubiCON: The Fifth Domain...

Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a continuous process in the context of our rapidly expanding corporate environments. What is one example? People traveling to emerging markets to explore new business opportunities or new suppliers that will be connected by high speed Internet connections to the supply chain management system. These boundaries of managing operational risk, have not only expanded, they have become invisible.
Ru·bi·con
1. a river in N Italy flowing E into the Adriatic


2. Rubicon, to take a decisive, irrevocable step
This "Digital Rubicon" before us, to take on a more "Active Defense" in navigating the risk across international waters of e-commerce, privacy and legal jurisdictions will forever shape our future. The decisions made on what constitutes an adversarial attack in the cyber domain, will not be as easy as the dawn of the nuclear age. Policy makers today have to weave the potential implications into a sophisticated decision tree that crosses the complex areas of intelligence, diplomacy, defense, law, commerce, economics and technology.

The new digital "Rule Sets" are currently being defined by not only nation states but the "Non-State" actors who dominate a segment of the global digital domains. The same kinds of schemes, ploys, communication tactics and strategies are playing out online and what has worked in the physical world, may also work even better in the cyber-centric environment. Corporations are increasingly under estimating the magnitude of the risk or the speed that it is approaching their front or back door steps.

The private sector is under tremendous oversight by various regulators, government agencies and corporate risk management. Yet the "public-private" "tug-of-war" over information sharing, leaks to the public press and Wikileaks-like incidents has everyone on full alert. As the government has outsourced the jobs that will take too long to execute or that the private sector already is an expert, operational risks have begun to soar.

As the private sector tasks morph with the requirements of government you perpetuate the gap for effective risk mitigation and spectacular incidents of failure. Whether it is the failure of people, processes, systems or some other clandestine event doesn't matter. The public-private paradox will continue as long as the two seek some form of symbiosis. The symbiotic relationship between a government entity and a private sector supplier must be managed no differently than any other mission critical resource within an unpredictable environment.

Once an organization has determined the vital combination of assets it requires to operate on a daily basis, then it can begin it's quest for enabling enterprise resiliency. The problem is, most companies still do not understand these complex relationships within the matrix of their business and therefore remain vulnerable. The only path to gaining that resilient outcome, is to finally cross that "Digital Rubicon" and realize that you no longer can control it.

The first step in any remediation program, is first to admit the problem and to accept the fact that it exists. Corporate enterprises and governments across the globe are coming to the realization that the only way forward is to cooperate, coordinate and contemplate a new level of trust.
"Simply put, Shodan is a search engine. While Google crawls the Internet looking for websites, Shodan is scanning for devices connected to the Internet and recording information about the software running on those devices. What has the press and security professionals worried is that Shodan has revealed wide-scale holes in Internet safety, from somewhat embarrassing privacy oversights to keep-you-up-at-night vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.  
Imagine a building. Now imagine a private detective checking out the building, snooping around the perimeter, noting what security company’s sticker is on the window, what kind of locks are on the doors, what kind of sprinkler system waters the landscaping, what brand of air conditioner is mounted on the roof, what electric company services the smart meter around the back. Now imagine that investigator does the same thing for every office, every home, every school, every factory, power plant, hospital and football stadium and uploads it to a publicly available database. That’s what Shodan does, but with IP addresses. It’s almost like an automated way to digitally case every joint in the world."

Saturday, March 07, 2015

Information Leaks: Risk Of The Data Supply Chain...

There is a well known threat that has been talked about with the Board of Directors behind closed doors for years. This threat is not new to most Operational Risk Management (ORM) professionals and yet executive management is still in denial that it could happen to us. Have you or someone in your C-Suite ever awakened one morning and wondered how the companies new plans for a merger are now in the published press? What about that new research and development breakthrough that ends up with another company with a similar process being patented a week or a month ahead of you?

What is the threat? Call it competitive intelligence, economic espionage, press leaks, loose lips or advanced persistent threat (APT), it does not really matter. The threat remains from all those people, rivals, industry peers, countries, states, allies and enemies that are working 24 x 7 x 365 to copy your valuable information and use it for their own advantage. What advantage depends on who obtains the valuable information and how they will eventually use it or sell it.

What is even more fascinating to most subject matter experts, is the amount of information that is still created and allowed to be compromised in some way that is false, fake and designed to confuse the adversary. So what is it, that much of executive management still does not understand about all of this? 

The "source" of the vulnerability that is leaking or allowing the secret or confidential information to be compromised. They still to this day are naive to the potential source. This source is not even inside their own company or organization in many cases. It is within the organizations data supply chain somewhere, but where is it exactly?

The answer is only possible to narrow down, if you absolutely know where your data and secret or confidential information is collected, transported and stored, in the hands of trusted third parties, outside the four walls of your business. That is the remedial first step. Creating a definitive map of who has custody of your data through some kind of third party agreement. The agreement could be with any number of key business partners in your data supply chain:

  • Banker
  • Venture Capitalist
  • Accountant
  • Attorney
  • Insurer
  • Internet Service Provider
  • Utility
  • Data Telecom Provider
  • Wireless Telecom Provider
  • Payments Processor
  • Document Custodian or Shredder

This short list is a good place to begin your quest for better understanding where the source of your information leak may be. Now think about this list and ask yourself who might have the most robust set of staff, resources and technology savvy people to keep your data safe. Regardless of the service level agreements or engagement letters in place, who is the most vulnerable on this list?

Even more important may be the question of which one of your data supply chain business partners, has the least amount of resources, people and state-of-the-art detection systems for the APT, Zeus, and other mechanisms that are ex-filtrating your data to another country. When was the last time you asked any of your business partners to walk you into their IT department for a look around with your CIO or CTO?
Believe us when we say that if you get that "Deer in the Headlights" look on your business partners face, you are in trouble. You can bet that the attackers are not attacking you, as much as they are attacking your data supply chain. As an example, if you say in public or on your public filings that you have your primary outside counsel firm as "Red, White and Blue," you can be assured that your adversaries will take notice.
You see, just because your organization has spent millions or billions on new data centers with the most sophisticated technologies available to counter your cyber adversaries, how can you be sure that your business data supply chain has done the same? There is only one way to do that and it is in person and on site. You may consider this level of due diligence before handing over your business for the merger and acquisition project or the development of a vital new component for your new patented product. A model "Request for Information" (RFI) on the business partners controls and capabilities for securing your sensitive, confidential and secret information shall be a first step requirement.

The second step shall be to get an inventory of what systems your data supply chain partner has in place to mitigate the risk of a data breach. At the top of that list, should be the management system that governs all the other hardware and software systems. So even if your business partner says they are using RSA NetWitness or ScoutVision on their corporate networks and Good MDM for their mobile devices, that is not going to be enough.  More from Europol:
A decline of traditional hierarchical criminal groups and networks will be accompanied
by the expansion of a virtual criminal underground made up of individual criminal entrepreneurs, which come together on a project-basis and lend their knowledge, expe- rience and expertise as part of a crime-as-a- service business model.
The overarching "Management System" is not about technology. It is not about your favorite eDiscovery or computer forensics guru. It is about the way your business partner trains and educates it's people. It is about how those people use relevant business controls to secure your secrets, confidential data and records. Look at their behavior around this topic of "Achieving A Defensible Standard of Care" and you will soon discover whether you have found the most ideal banker, accountant or attorney to entrust to your digital supply chain.

Sunday, January 18, 2015

Blackhat: Corporate Counterintelligence Capability...

If you are an Operational Risk Management (ORM) professional you should invest time to see the latest movie on Information Security this weekend.  Michael Mann's latest production is entitled "Blackhat" and it has a few lessons learned including several stark reminders of the current state of industrial asymmetric warfare.

While you may laugh at some of the scenes, there are some effective learning points along the way.  Even better, consider inviting one of your corporate executives to the movie with you.  They could walk away with a better understanding of the active cybercrime and cyberterrorism syndicates that have global operations.

The motivations for these continuous cyber attacks in most cases can be described in one word, "Greed".  The human factors associated with greed continue to become more exemplified in the digital Internet of Things (IoT) domain year-to-year.  So what does Wired Magazine and Cade Metz have to say about this latest hacker movie?
For Parisa Tabriz, who sits at the center of the info-sec universe as the head of Google’s Chrome security team, it’s a Hollywood moment that rings remarkably true. “It’s not flashy, but it’s something that real criminals have tried—and highlights the fundamental security problems with foreign USB devices.” 
Tabriz will also tell you that such accuracy—not to mention the subtlety of the scene with the coffee-stained papers—is unusual for a movie set in the world of information security. And she’s hardly alone in thinking so. Last week, Tabriz helped arrange an early screening of Blackhat in San Francisco for 200-odd security specialists from Google, Facebook, Apple, Tesla, Twitter, Square, Cisco, and other parts of Silicon Valley’s close-knit security community, and their response to the film was shockingly, well, positive. 
Judging from the screening Q&A—and the pointed ways this audience reacted during the screening—you could certainly argue Blackhat is the best hacking movie ever made.
Hollywood, California is getting closer to understanding how to reach a broad audience who are interested in the commercial cyber thriller.  The cyber themed movies have been around for years including "Sneakers" with Robert Redford in 1992.  So what has changed, after all of these attempts to help illustrate the spectrum of Operational Risks impacting the corporate enterprise?  Sabotage on critical infrastructure is ever more present.  So what has remained the same?

Still to this day there remains a tremendous amount of complacency on the risk of "Insider Threat." To illustrate this further; what are some of the common factors in all espionage incidents in the U.S. since 1950?
  • More than 1/3 of those who committed espionage had no security clearance. 
  • Twice as many “insiders” volunteered as were recruited. 
  • 1/3 of those who committed espionage were naturalized U.S. citizens. 
  • Most recent spies acted alone. 
  • Nearly 85% passed information before being caught. 
  • Out of the 11 most recent cases, 90% used computers while conducting espionage and 2/3 used the Internet to initiate malicious contact.
What can a corporation do in an environment of competing resources for talent, new tools and an increasing focus on consumer privacy?  Having an effective counterintelligence program within your organization is paramount to preserving your intellectual property and the integrity of the U.S. industrial supply chain.  So where should you start?

Begin your organizations awareness building with a robust program on cyber security:
Welcome to the InfraGard Awareness Security Awareness Course - We all have a role to play in protecting ourselves and the nation from the impact of cybercrime and identity theft, and that role can begin in the workplace. 
The better you are at protecting your own workplace from cybercrime and identity theft, the fewer opportunities criminals, petty thieves, and even terrorists will have to exploit security vulnerabilities for their own purposes.
  1. "What technologies do you want to protect from your competitors (e.g., R&D, supply chain, pricing and customer service information, contracts, production and maintenance records, etc.)  Do you believe you are adequately protecting them?  Can you rank these items by level of importance?  
  2. What information or technology (including expertise in manufacturing, production, or operations) are foreign competitors lacking that keeps them from being competitive?  Identify the various applications (both military and commercial) of your product or service.
  3. Do you have a reporting program in place to track how and where your critical/emerging technologies are being targeted by domestic and foreign adversaries?  If so, what trends have you seen?"
  • Source:  FBI SPIN:  15-001
The genesis of any mature insider threat program beings with the strategic development of a robust counterintelligence capability within your Operational Risk Management (ORM) framework.  The future of your organization and the safety and economic security of the entire nation is at stake.

Sunday, December 14, 2014

Intellectual Property: Material Risks Disclosure- Assumption of Breach...

The rules of the game may have changed across the corporate landscape.  Corporations that have been proactive in the management of Operational Risks, are making headlines in the published press. There is a race to build new 100,000 Sq. Ft. data centers around the globe, in order to satisfy the insatiable competitive appetite of bandwidth hungry enterprises:
Sony Pictures Entertainment is fighting back. 
The studio behind the “Spider-Man” franchise and “The Social Network” has taken technological countermeasures to disrupt downloads of its most sensitive information, which was exposed when a hacking attack crippled its systems in late November.

The company is using hundreds of computers in Asia to execute what’s known as a denial of service attack on sites where its pilfered data is available, according to two people with direct knowledge of the matter. 
Sony is using Amazon Web Services, the Internet retailer’s cloud computing unit, which operates data centers in Tokyo and Singapore, to carry out the counterattack, one of the sources said. The tactic was once commonly employed by media companies to combat Internet movie and music piracy. 
In one of the most devastating cyber security breaches in recent memory, a hacking group calling itself Guardians of Peace claimed to have stolen just under 100 terabytes of Sony Pictures’ financial information, budgets, payroll data, internal emails and feature films and has slowly leaked portions of it to public file-sharing sites such as PasteBin.
The cyber war has been facilitated by the rise of substantial new digital weapons and the cloud-based compute power to make it all happen.  The question is not who is behind the latest DoS of "PasteBin" as much as when the next Stuxnet-like design will gain favor, by a private sector organization.  You see, the use of sophisticated offensive cyber malware is not new.  No different than conventional chemical weapons that are developed by nation states, the variants and new "Zero Days" ultimately could end up in the hands of militias and clandestine dark sites on the net for sale.

In the recent book "Countdown to Zero Day" by Kim Zetter, the point is made:
Before Stuxnet, most of America’s military and intelligence cyber-operations focused on stealing or distorting data, or used cyber-tools to help direct U.S. weapons. Stuxnet was envisioned by U.S. officials as a replacement for a conventional weapon. Using a computer virus or worm to gum up the works of something from within would provide an alternative to, say, destroying a nuclear facility from the air. Stuxnet appears to have done that. “Stuxnet stands alone as the only known cyberattack to have caused physical destruction to a system,” Zetter writes.
The physical digital copying, erasure or even encryption of corporate data, that then becomes the focus of an extortion plot, is the Operational Risk Management (ORM) business problem that remains on your Board Room doorstep. The Sony Board of Directors now understand the liability of dealing with a $100 million plus incident, as an adverse material event, spawned from the cyber domain.  The rules of the digital game have changed.  Now what can be done about this particular wake up call?

Besides getting your outside counsel ramping up for a tremendous cache of billable hours and your Information Governance Teams burning the midnight oil, the future strategy is now evolving.  How many digital files in your corporation contain proprietary Intellectual Property (IP)?  If you don't know the answer, then we recommend that you start counting.  You need to figure out what the value is, of all this data and for good reason.  At the other end of the Operational Risk spectrum are the SEC regulatory issues in the U.S..  Jeffrey Carr explains here:
“Consistent with the Regulation S-K Item 503(c) requirements for risk factor disclosures generally, cybersecurity risk disclosure provided must adequately describe the nature of the material risks and specify how each risk affects the registrant. Registrants should not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering and should avoid generic risk factor disclosure.” 
The value of your particular organizations Intellectual Property can then be compared against the requirements for your IP, on a global basis.  What countries or companies are spinning up Research & Development operations in the same IP space that your organization is operating in?  What U.S. companies are encouraged to relocate a manufacturing plant overseas?  Why is this significant? The correlation is that if there are a rising number of foreign R&D labs focused on your particular category of IP, then you can guess that your company is going to be a substantial target for sustained industrial espionage.  Regulatory burdens exist and yet may not be the greatest risk.

When there is not enough time or money to infiltrate your organization with insider human assets, then the outsourcing of digital theft campaigns will begin, or a combination of insider theft operations in cooperation with outsourcing.  The hackers-for-hire trade, is larger than you may know.  How much do you think a nation state would pay for a "Stuxnet" Zero Day on the open market in todays U.S. dollars?  Mid to high six figures.  Not likely.  7 or 8 figures is getting closer.

While the malware designed for the exfiltration of data from Sony Pictures is different than Stuxnet's design to disrupt a specific type of Siemens Controller for a certain IR-1 centrifuge, the intent and motive may be quite similar.  To disrupt and destroy the capabilities of your adversary.  Now the question for Sony is whether this was a nation state or simply a "disgruntled insider," or possibly both that can be attributed to the sabotage attack.

The complexity and the longevity of the risk is evident.  The magnitude and the impact of the destruction is apparent.  Are you sure you don't have an Insider Threat?  See appendix C here:
This fourth edition of the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats provides the most current recommendations of the CERT® Program (part of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute), based on an expanded database of more than 700 insider threat cases and continued research and analysis. It introduces the topic of insider threats, explains its intended audience and how this guide differs from previous editions, defines insider threats, and outlines current patterns and trends. The guide then describes 19 practices that organizations should implement across the enterprise to prevent and detect insider threats, as well as case studies of organizations that failed to do so. Each practice includes features new to this edition: challenges to implementation, quick wins and high-impact solutions for small and large organizations, and relevant security standards. This edition also focuses on six groups within an organization-human resources, legal, physical security, data owners, information technology, and software engineering-and maps the relevant groups to each practice. The appendices provide a revised list of information security best practices, a new mapping of the guide's practices to established security standards, a new breakdown of the practices by organizational group, and new checklists of activities for each practice.